We are working through a series on the air power transition in Afghanistan. We view such a transition to an alternative of just leaving.
The USAF and the ISAF trainers have been working hard for a number of years to shape a fleet and a trained force to operate that fleet in order to execute such a transition.
The broad transition envisaged by the USAF can be identified as a transition from a gaggle of older aircraft to a much smaller mixed fleet to support counter-insurgency and defense operations for the Afghan forces. And shaping such a capability puts in place a force with which the US and NATO allies can re-enforce the Afghans as needed with a very flexible and insertable force in the future.
The broad trajectory of change has been to move from a Russian-equipped force in disrepair to shaping a mixed fleet of aircraft able to support the various missions which the Afghans would need: transport, ground support and counter-insurgency ISAR and strike.
A new one is replacing the core fleet of aging Mi-35s and AN-32s.
The new fleet will be a mixed fleet of aircraft as well as adding capabilities to replace the current battlefield lift provided by the Chinooks.
The Mi-35s are being completed and replaced with new or upgraded Mi-17s, a Light Attack Aircraft to provide for both strike and ISR, and lift assets. Problems in replacement have been generated by the failure to date to procure the Super Tucano, the clear favorite of the USAF for the mission and the collapse of the C-27 program in Afghanistan.
Shaping the right fleet is crucial to shaping an effective training mission.
The broad trajectory of change has been to move from a Russian-equipped force in disrepair to shaping a mixed fleet of aircraft able to support the various missions which the Afghans would need: transport, ground support and counter-insurgency ISAR and strike.
A new one is replacing the core fleet of aging Mi-35s and AN-32s.
The new fleet will be a mixed fleet of aircraft as well as adding capabilities to replace the current battlefield lift provided by the Chinooks.
The Mi-35s are being completed and replaced with new or upgraded Mi-17s, a Light Attack Aircraft to provide for both strike and ISR, and lift assets. Problems in replacement have been generated by the failure to date to procure the Super Tucano, the clear favorite of the USAF for the mission and the collapse of the C-27 program in Afghanistan.
Shaping the right fleet is crucial to shaping an effective training mission.
Obviously, beyond simply learning basic rotorcraft or fixed wing flying skills, training has to be focused on the particular aircraft.
Notably, because the leave behind approach really has to be focused on a smaller fleet or rugged, reliable and maintainable aircraft.
http://www.sldinfo.com/training-for-transition-the-re-emergence-of-the-afghan-air-force/
It is clear that the USAF has looked carefully at the plane it wants for the attack and ISR combination and that plane is the Super Tucano.
As the head of USAF training in Afghanistan underscored when the Super Tucano was down selected in 2012:
According to Brig. Gen. Tim Ray, the NATO Air Training Command-Afghanistan commander, the Tucano was “tailor made” for the Afghan’s counterinsurgency mission and provides a cost-effective, easy to sustain platform to help augment the Afghan air force’s already capable lift and training platforms.
“The LAS platform signals a milestone in moving beyond lift and rotary wing where we’re really not going after the enemy,” Ray said.
“The Tucano is the most kinetic, most offensive aircraft they’ll have, and I’m sure a big morale boost to the troops on the ground when they see it overhead. It’s the right kind of platform for the terrain, the fight and most importantly, it’s easy to sustain,” he said.
Built for counterinsurgency missions, the light air support platform — specifically the Tucano — has been the heavy lifter in fighting antigovernment elements around the world. More than 150 units across the globe have logged a collective 130,000 flight hours with more than 18,000 combat hours with no recorded losses.
Mirroring the same success in Afghanistan relies on two primary missions. The first is ensuring related costs of the light air support stay within the Afghan government’s current and projected budgets.
“The LAS operates at a fraction of the cost of other strike platforms,” Ray said. “The engine in the aircraft is incredibly reliable and very simple. We have the same engines in the Cessna 208s and it’s the most reliable in the aircraft industry that I’m aware of.”
The second is training pilots and pilot trainers capable of handling the aircraft in combat scenarios.
“The Afghans are good aviators,” Ray said. “When it comes to the basic stick and rudder skills and bravery, they are more than suitable, and we have two curriculums being refined to train the advisors and to train the students. We already have students flowing out of the different pilot training pipelines and learning the basics of flying fixed wing aircraft. The follow on of course would be a mission training program that would give them the skills to employ the LAS in combat.”
The light air support’s addition marks the final major complement to the Afghan air force’s inventory of more than 100 varied aircraft and sets the stage for future growth. Basic training for the light air support airframe will be conducted at Shindand Air Base with follow on mission training held at a different location yet to be determined.
http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123286333
There is obviously a getting on with it quality to adding the Super Tucano to the Afghan Air Force fleet to shape the transitional and collaborative capabilities to enable greater competence in providing for their own needs.
But Beechcraft, recently just out of bankruptcy, and having lost repeatedly in the competition to the Super Tucano apparently not only knows better than the USAF but is in line to take charge for a global mission beyond Afghanistan. And all of this is under the guise that an American product should dominate in the light attack marketplace.
In an amazing letter sent to Congress, Beechcraft and the Machinists Union have provided a parallel universe of reality to explain what OUGHT to happen.
One can puzzle over the Machinists Union weighing. How are those factories in Mexico doing? And why would Machinists wish to throw away an F-18 aircraft in Brazil for 20 aircraft in Afghanistan?
One can puzzle even more over why Beechcraft is going after the USAF when without the USAF their future as a training aircraft provider can be questioned.
But leaving all of that aside here are some excerpts from this letter.
In the letter we learn that the selection of the Super Tucano was inappropriate because although appropriate to the case in point, there is a broader partnership aircraft program. And we learn that such a program, if it ever really happens, is “particularly disturbing because the full consequences to our national security, the American industrial base and its works, as well as the American taxpayer, are so staggering.”
Before we go further there are a number of questions to pose.
First, when did Beechcraft become so American? The video below shows the future of Beechcraft in Mexico. Apparently speaking Spanish is American; Portuguese is not.
Second, the airframe used by Beechcraft is licensed from Pilatus, that all American Swiss company. What are the licensing arrangements between Beechcraft and Pilatus and can Beechcraft offer its aircraft without Pilatus approval in each and every country the USAF would wish to partner?
To put a fine point on it, when I was involved with a team working in the UAE with regard to sorting through trainer aircraft options, one of the aircraft in play was Pilatus and then when the UAE Air Force was considering its next iteration of a trainer they wanted what one UAE General called a “modern trainer appropriate to our 21st century modernization.”
http://www.pilatus-aircraft.com/
This Inside the Beltway practice of asserting global numbers which never happen – some day there might be 26 nations involved – is used to beat a program to death. Just ask the US Coast Guard how their acquisition recapitalization is going after the “largest procurement program in USCG history” or Deepwater is going?
We learn that “a foreign sovereign controlled manufacturer is now a critical component of the United State’s ability to conduct security force assistance operations.”
And this is from a company that was willing to sell out to the People’s Republic of China? Let us get real here.
Even more amazing – it would take a line by line comment to highlight how “puzzling” this letter really is – is the assertion that somehow Beecher has an advantage in “supply chain, logistics and maintenance.”
The AT-6 is an unfinished and new aircraft. The USAF just went through an experience in Afghanistan of deploying a unique aircraft with little global support – the C27J – and pulled the plug on the aircraft after learning that a mature product globally supported in Afghanistan is what they needed. Based on that learning, why would the USAF wish to do this all over again with the AT-6.
Oh that is right. Beechcraft knows best, and the customer does not.
I will leave this breathtaking sentence from a company which tried to sell out its core capabilities to the Chinese.
“Brazil certainly understands, as does China, that the linkages between product development, domestic manufacturing, and strategic investments in their aerospace industrial base and workforce – all strengthen their military capacities while expanding their indigenous industry.”
Oh by the way – the Super Tucano will be built in a foreign country called Florida. This reminds one of the nonsense from Boeing during the tanker competition when a foreign airframe was going to destroy the US aerospace industrial base. How is that going by the way? As the Aussies fly their new tankers, where are the US tankers?
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