The article by Ed Timperlake reminds us in a very direct manner of how damaging the IOC critics living in their time frozen Igloo are to US strategic interests.
It is amazing to me how truly “inside the beltway” and myopic this F-35B debate has become. We have allies counting on us and trusting the US and somehow they have been totally lost in the debate.
In our inside the beltway culture that all those arguing costs numbers and others who are assertional cubical commandos have totally ignored the Italian contribution to NATO and the Med.
The Italian commitment of a Billion dollars to build a beautifully designed Aircraft Carrier for the F-35B is a tribute to the faith and commitment the Italian Government made for the US to keep it’s word. Tragically, this is nowhere to be found in the Undersecretary’s memo.
The F-35 is part of enabling a coalition of like-minded states and shaping a global fleet capability. Allies worldwide are building ships upon which the F-35B could land and operate. Yet the myopic IOC cost focus, forgets the capability issue and notably coalition capability. In a cost downturn, the US would wish to have less or more allies? The US would wish to have a globally enabled fleet of C4ISR D aircraft or stovepiped fleets located on specific US decks?
http://www.sldforum.com/2011/11/the-italian-carrier-and-the-f-35/
Much of the discussion of the F-35 seems to revolve around a projected IOC cost of the three variants of the F-35. Despite the fleet commonality and the very significant economies of scale and the blunt fact that one gains virtually nothing from canceling one variant, the assertions continue. Despite fleet savings and capabilities, the IOC of a single plane is the vortex of much of the “debate.” And in a logic only the Congress would understand, you cut the production number of planes being produced off a modern manufacturing line to “save” costs. This is the equivalent of turning an I Pad production line from an assembly line to hand tooling and argue that the per unit cost gets better. Again, only Inside the Beltway can achieve such dizzying intellectual heights in intellectual discourse.
But let us take a FLEET perspective. First, the three US services will operate a common fleet across their various bases or platforms. This has never been done in the modern era. The commonalities in everything which matters are a significant boost to operational capabilities as well as savings. Second, it is an INTERNATIONAL fleet. No F-35 will fly alone; it will have many family members, cousins and kin. In the Pacific, will it matter if the F-35As contributing to the fight are South Korean, Australian or Japanese to the maritime operators for the USCG, the USN or the USMC?
And the fleet approach is even more significant for the future of weaponization. Instead of having to integrate weapons to single models of aircraft, the commonality of software across the FLEET means that a USAF weapon can be available from a software integration perspective for the other two variants. Testing will need to be conducted to ensure that the aerodynamics of each variant fits the weapon, but there will not be a software Tower of Babel getting in the way.
Even more compelling is the impact of the F-35 on infrastructure. First, there is the infrastructure to deploy. The F-35 is part of shaping a capability to have an economy of force strategy, whereby the availability of the joint services as well as partners will reduce the need to surge a unique service’s planes to the problem. Second, while operating, the maintenance revolution will reduce the costs of deployment. The shaping of a global sustainment strategy will allow sharing of parts and transparency in supply to allow for basing to become global. And the demands on the transportation system — notably air mobility assets — will come down. Third, when returning from operations, the FLEET will not need to bring all of its kit it takes to battle home. The global sustainment system allows for significant reductions in the footprint that needs to go to the battle. The recent leave behinds in Iraq reminds one of how useful it is to have an agile sustainment system.
And there are many other infrastructure commonalities. The new hangers generated now in Yuma, Arizona and at Eglin AFB will replicated worldwide after a significant cost saving learning curve. The new deck coating laid down on the initial amphibs will be used widely to support the fleet. The list is long in this area. Again having a FLEET means economies of scale and savings.
But back in the IOC igloo, we are focused on today’s estimate or perhaps sustainment dollars in 2065. Operational realities do not matter.
Even more amazing is the allied dimension is of no significance to the residents of the IOC Igloo. Many of our closest allies are in the F-35 program. Every F-35 they buy becomes a member of the global fleet. Admiral Mullen once talked about the 1,000 ship Navy as something created by allied cooperation. This cooperation is built into every F-35 bought by allies. The notion of driving up costs by CUTTING numbers of aircraft runs in the face of supporting core allies.
Why don’t the IOC Igloo residents just come out and say it: there is no strategic perspective on the table and it does not matter if the US throws its allies over the side. At least Lindbergh was honest enough to argue for his isolationist perspective in the 1930a, For eviscerating the global fleet of F-35s is just that. Lindberghism for the 21st century.
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