The Chinese Approach: Go

A 2,000-year-old board game holds the key to understanding how the Chinese really think—and U.S. officials had better learn to play if they want to win the real competition…..

Go features multiple battles over a wide front, rather than a single decisive encounter. It emphasizes long-term planning over quick tactical advantage, and games can take hours. In Chinese, its name, wei qi (roughly pronounced “way-chee”), means the “encirclement game.”

What Kind of Game Is China Playing?

Keith Johnson, The Wall Street Journal
June 11, 2011

Read the full article

The Pacific Dimension: Sizing the Challenge

The key to understanding any human conflicts in the Pacific is to first recognize both the natural power and size of that Ocean.

As the Father of the American Navy John Paul Jones said about the quality of a Naval Officer —“It is by no means enough that an officer of the Navy should be a capable mariner. He must be that, of course, but also a great deal more. He should be as well a gentleman of liberal education, refined manners, punctilious courtesy, and the nicest sense of personal honor.”

Being a capable mariner is thus a given by any Naval Force to simply survive to fight in the Pacific.

The Pacific is nothing like the name  –“Pacificum” or peaceful in Latin.   It is a violent and expansive Ocean. Rounding the tip of South America. Ferdinand Magellan, in perhaps one of the more significant “name branding” mistakes in history pronounced the body of water he saw as peaceful.

Before any consideration can be given to discussing the rise of the Peoples Republic of China in the Pacific to discuss US ability to deal with an ascendant China the simple size and magnitude of the that Ocean from the Arctic down must be acknowledged.

The answer to the question how large is the Pacific is very simple — it is huge.

“The Size of the Pacific Ocean is Massive; it covers more than one-third of the earth’s surface, which is approximately 165 million square kilometers (about 65 million square miles). It extends about 15,000 kilometers (9,600 miles).”

The question of how dangerous and violent is the Pacific was answered by Sir Francis Beaufort in the 19th Century in his code measuring storms at sea “The Beaufort Scale.”

After being wounded several times and commanding a Royal Navy ship of war Beaufort became Hydrographer of the Royal Navy for twenty-five years. In fact some of his charts are still used to this day.  Sir Francis was a visionary who specifically recognized the strategic importance of the entire Pacific and he also focused on the strategic importance of the Arctic.

His  “Beaufort Scale” runs from 1 to 12 with a Force 12 being “Hurricane Winds.” –“Huge waves and sea is completely white with foam and driving spray greatly reduces visibility”.

However, in 2006 the Peoples Republic of China adopted a scale that goes to a high of 17 to acknowledge what they saw as the power of a tropical cyclone off their shore known as a “Chinese Typhoon.”

Consequently, all ocean going mariners, from early explores on war canoes, to Chinese Junks, to European sailing vessels to modern battle fleets must have a very healthy respect for the pure raw power and also extremely significant distances involved with the Pacific Ocean.

It is still very true that even a 21st Century Navy can only venture forth with ships and planes that are rugged, survivable and have the range to go up against both nature and in combat against a reactive enemy — it is not as easy as the US Navy makes it look.

A famous World War Pacific Typhoon makes that startling point. Historians have debated the number of USN Ships sunk by Japanese Kamikaze attacks during all of WW II in the Pacific. Their counts vary from a low of 34 to a high of 47.

Compare that Kamikaze fight against a reactive enemy over a almost a four year war with a US Task Force caught in a Pacific Typhoon in one 24 hour period.

In the Pacific Typhoon of December 18, 1944 three Destroyers capsized; the USS Spence, USS Hull, USS Monaghan, with the loss of most of their crew–over 700 hundred sailors perished. Additionally, 146 aircraft on Fleet Carriers were struck from the rolls because of damage. So yes being capable mariners along with rugged ships and planes makes a huge difference.

The Arctic and Northern Pacific:

To look at distance a globe is required not a Mercator map. Looking at a globe gives one an appreciation of the great circle shipping lanes. There is a northern pacific trade route essentially from the Chinese Coast passing Japan, Russia, Alaska from the tip of the Attu, along the Aleutians, into Canadian and American west coast ports — of course “passing” is a relative term in distance especially to avoid bad weather.

However, the Imperial Japanese Navy took advantage of the Northern Pacific route to use that part of the ocean to both hide their Pearl Harbor attack fleet and also their Midway Strike Force. The American Navy learned in both the disaster at Pearl Harbor and their great war tipping victory in “the Miracle of Midway” to pay close attention to that part the largest Ocean in the world.

Additionally, the US Coast Guard, with undaunted courage is currently operating consistently in arctic and Alaskan waters. The Northern Pacific is a team effort with the US Navy and Coast Guard.

Carrying the fight to Imperial Japan was difficult. In World War II, for command and control and resource allocation American Commanders divided up the Pacific into essentially two complementary but independent Combat theaters.

Admiral Nimitz led his “Central Pacific” Island hopping campaign and General MacArthur his South West Pacific Campaign into the Philippines. Forces and battle tactics were similar but different. Regardless of each Commanders approach both were successful and victory achieved.

With respect to the Peoples Republic of China looking at the geography of the Pacific might be different than the WWII Japanese Island geographic model. There are still two areas of action but they can be looked at differently.

The “Blue Water Engagement Zone”:

There is a “Blue Water Engagement Zone” — picture a slightly askew great circle trapezoid from San Diego, to Tokyo to Hainan Island (PRC) to Darwin Australia. In order to traverse that trapezoid the journey is over 18,000 miles and inside that area is a lot of Blue Water for USN Carrier Battle Groups to maneuver while approaching the PRC Coast.

Of course, maneuvering far at sea is essentially trading distance for effectiveness and is a problem.  But it is not as easy as it looks to write off the USN surface battle force as a “wasting asset” — the Forum will discuss this concept of writing off the surface fleet because precision attack weapons with remote sensors are so deadly. So were Kamikazes.

However, it must be noted a combat airfield capable of sustained operations and maneuvering at over thirty knots is a force to contend with.  This Blue Water maneuvering force will eventually have to go into combat.  However, it must be noted and not minimized that the opposition is limited by geographically fixed points — airfields, IRBM missile sites and Command and Control bunkers.

Of course, the enemy always gets a vote so the PRC forces can also maneuver on the land air, sea and subsurface. That is the crux of this forum’s question.  But the PRC must realize that the US Navy has a long history of Blue Water Operations and is designed to be in its “Blue Water” element over such a vast expanse of Ocean.

This forum will discuss the awakening of the PRC to their need also for a Blue Water Navy.

Finally, even though Carrier Battle Groups (CBGs) have tremendous maneuvering room to greatly complicate any attack against them. They have to have forces to close with and engaged the enemy.  Consequently, when the time is right the third geographic issue comes into play — the Littoral.

The Littoral

“The Littoral” is a way of saying close to the shore-how close is a moving scale. It is simple to say in any potential Pacific Combat it is where the Navy/Marine Amphibious Ready Groups have to approach close enough to be effective-this is called “from the sea.”

In order to get into Littoral waters, ships must be capable of operating in the Blue Water Engagement Zone — speed range and endurance come into play. But the Amphibious force has to also be designed as a self contained combat survivable and capable swing force — sized appropriately to close with an enemy and engage in combat if required.

This forum will hopefully allow a robust debate on the rise of the PRC and the moves and counter moves that can be made by all US Forces maneuvering over the largest contiguous area on the globe — one third of the earth’s surface.


The Chinese Science and Technology Challenge

Excerpts from an Interview with Mark Lewis, President, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Willis Young Professor and Chair, Department of Aerospace Engineering. Dr. Lewis is the former Chief Scientist of the Air Force under Secretaries James Roche and Michael Wynne.  He is a distinguished expert, among other things, on hypersonics.

If we look at those technologies that the Chinese are investing in, not surprisingly in some cases they’re the same technologies that we’re investing in.  And so, I think an obvious question is why are they doing this; what are their goals, what are their interests? Before we address specific technical areas, I’ll tell you a very interesting story, which just happened yesterday.  I got a paper to review for one of our technical journals: the author was extremely familiar with the American literature in the field – the Chinese actually read our literature very carefully – though we’re not able to read their technical literature in the way that they’re able to read our open literature. In this particular case, it was obvious that this researcher had read our literature, because he had actually committed wholesale plagiarism out of sections of papers that were written by American researchers in his paper.

As I’m staring at this, I’m thinking that there are several aspects to this that are intriguing:

First, the author is clearly someone who’s trying to make an entrée into the international research community and trying to do so with credentials that are being derived from another source.

Second, it shows a familiarity with the work that we are doing in the U.S..

There are clearly several interpretations you can derive.  One is, they recognize the value of what we do, and they recognize the quality of research content.  Two, it shows a level of monitoring of the sorts of things that we’re doing. Three, I think it shows a desire to at least match some of our activities, and to interact, maybe participate, maybe compete, maybe also collaborate in certain areas.

I’ll give you another anecdote.  About 10 months ago, we had a major international conference in my own primary field, hypersonics.  It was sponsored by an American organization, the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics.  I’m actually the president of that organization this year.

The meeting was hosted by the German Aerospace Center, the DLR, in Bremen, Germany, and so it had a significant international draw.  About 30-percent of the papers submitted at that conference came from Mainland China.

Now you step back and you say what is the range of applications of hypersonics?  It’s everything from reentry from space, and we know they have a robust space program, to high-speed weapons, to maybe eventually space launch vehicles.  So the Chinese work could play into a full range of products, both military and civilian

But it suggests a level of investment; as one of my colleagues at the conference said, a few years ago when we would see Chinese submissions at these sort of venues, the papers were frankly less sophisticated than papers coming from Europe and the United States.

Now they’re extremely sophisticated; they’re asking the right questions.  They obviously understand the work that other people are doing, which to me shows that not only are they investing the time and the effort into becoming familiar with the literature, but also they’re obviously doing their own work along the way.  They’re asking questions that show that they’re investing heavily in their own research activities.

They’re iterative indeed, but when they become graduate students, the great leap to becoming a graduate student is that we expect them to be innovative.  We expect them to do research, formulate their own problems, and to develop their own approaches. I think countries follow an analogous process.  I think that a country such as Japan or China, or frankly, any country that’s trying to build up a capability in a technology area will actually start out by first learning what others have done. When I start a graduate student on a research problem, I say go to the library, read the papers, and see what other people have done.  And then they start formulating their ideas, they understand the advances, they understand the shortcomings, and then they begin to build on that to do their own innovation.

I think that’s what we’re seeing across the board with the Chinese.  Hypersonics is one of those areas where a few years ago we saw that they were just getting up to speed in the area.  They were just, obviously, reading the papers in the open literature. And now we’re seeing them presenting and developing new ideas.  Exploring the field, presenting papers on basic research, building facilities.  So that’s one aspect.

There’s another element that I think we have to remember, and that is that quantity has a quality in and of itself.  Again, I’ll often hear people say dismissively, “well yes, the Chinese are producing many more engineers, but they are not up to the standards that we have,” (although in many cases, they are). And to that I’ll answer “well, if we’re producing a thousand experts in our field, and they’re producing 10,000 experts in the field, and if 10-percent of their people are as good as the people we’re producing, they’re still doing pretty well.

If you generate a certain volume of expertise in a field; if you invest a certain amount in the field, not only in dollars, but also across the board in the workforce, you’re bound to see benefits.

We’ve seen the ability to leapfrog in technology. My friends in directed energy tell me that they have seen advances in the open literature in what the Chinese are doing that really surprised them, that they were moving at a pace that was much faster than anyone had previously expected. I think a lot of that is just putting in a lot of resources.  We’ve done that in the past in our country, in the Manhattan project: when you think about the investment in the Manhattan project, we were able to realize incredible technological accomplishments with massive investments.

Another example: the B-29 Bomber. It’s one of my favorites from aeronautics. We basically sunk a lot of money and a lot of resources and a lot of manpower and produced an aircraft that, at the end of World War II, was literally a generation beyond the aircraft that have preceded it. So when you make those sorts of investments, and especially when you’re in a country where labor isn’t that expensive, you can have these incredible accomplishments. And I think it behooves us to step back and say well, why are they making these investments?  What are their goals, what are they after?  I think that’s a question all of us with an interest in this subject should ponder.

For quite some time, we’ve had a very high number of Chinese students in the United States educational system.  The joke is that there are some science and engineering departments in the United States where the dominant language is Mandarin Chinese.  And that’s been the case for many years.

The joke is that there are some science and engineering departments in the United States where the dominant language is Mandarin Chinese.

What we’re seeing in recent years, including on a campus such as ours, is a rather profound change.  Whereas 10 years ago, when we had Chinese students arrive, their goal was generally to stay in the United States.  They wanted to get an education here and they wanted to become Americans, and they wanted to work in American technology.  And so the question they’d ask is how do they become citizens?  How do they become part of the American experience?

Now more and more, we are seeing students whose goal is to learn, and then go back to their homeland and bring the lessons that they’ve learned here back to their home country.  In many cases, they see more opportunities; they see tremendous economic opportunities there.  They also see, I think, social opportunities to advance faster in their home country than they see here.

To a certain extent, I think we’ve hurt ourselves when we have created barriers for some of these folks to remain here, though in some cases we have done so for very good reasons.  But as a byproduct, we are essentially helping to create our own competition.

Clearly there are crosscutting choices or trends.  On the one hand, you don’t want to close your doors entirely; the free flow of information, the exchange of ideas is one of the things that drives the scientific community.  When you clamp down strongly, then you hurt yourself; you limit your own ideas, you wind up getting stuck in your own sandbox.  So bringing in fresh ideas, having an international exchange is a normal part of academic life.

There are really smart people all over the world.  And so you don’t want to stop that sort of free flow of information when it’s appropriate.  When I was on the Air Staff I’d always point to the example of the United States Air Force having very robust international research programs.  The Air Force has a research office in Tokyo, a research office in London, and just opened up a research office in Santiago, Chile.  They fund researchers around the world, and there are many good reasons for doing so.

There are smart people all over the globe that you want to tap into them.  There’s also the argument that when we bring people in from overseas that they learn about us; they learn about our systems, they absorb our values, they learn why this is such a great country.  And I think they carry that message back.

But of course, there’s also the flipside, which is that we wind up in some cases, selling the farm.  We wind up giving away technologies, giving away knowledge.  It’s that fine line that I think we’re frankly very challenged by, and that in some cases we’ve seen other potential adversaries, potential competitors exploit and use against us.

Excerpted from Meeting the Chinese Challenge

The Chinese Challenge

The ability of the Chinese to accelerate innovation in the air domain is quite impressive.  They now have the ability to make major investments with the monies that are available from their economic growth for continued investment in research and development. That growth in the Chinese economy allows for investment in innovation.

Unfortunately, until recently little concern has been evidenced by senior US defense leadership regarding the strategic challenges posed by the Chinese. How much investment is China making in advanced research and development vis-à-vis what the United States is doing? That will tell you how rapidly China will be able to accelerate in terms of military capability at a period in time where the United States is throttling back in terms of military capability…..

China used to view the United States as the gold standard for which to aspire to in terms of military capability to emulate. Now they’re specifically targeting how to disable or negate what used to be U.S. advantages. From their perspective it’s becoming increasingly easier and easier to do that as the current U.S. Department of Defense leadership has elected to focus on the present to a much greater degree than the future.

There is a group-think that has captured the security elite that since we’ve been dominant in conventional warfare over the past quarter-century, we’ll remain so in the future.  It’s a convenient presumption given the current economic environment, but a very dangerous one. It may play to conventional wisdom to state that the biggest threat to defense is the deficit, and while partially accurate, the immutable nature of conflict—and deterrence—is more basic—strength wins over weakness.

As one looks to the future — given the current investment path the United States is on — the United States and our allies are becoming weaker.

The difficult position to take — given the current economic conditions and nation-building engagements we have elected to pursue — is to articulate the kind of investments we need to make in defense to secure a position of strength in the next quarter-century…..

The Chinese have told us to “pound sand” with respect to our recent “signals” regarding North Korean actions, and they will continue to do so as long as we speak with hollow words…..We don’t have the dominant capability that results in a real determinant that moving force in the region would actually demonstrate…

The Chinese used to have vast quantities of airplanes that were not qualitatively that good. Well, now they’re transitioning very rapidly from quantity to a qualitative force and transforming their old fighters into remotely piloted aircraft with sufficient quantities and in a mix that will pose a very complex military challenge across the board…..

(For a more complete look at Deptula’s assessment of the evolution of Chinese Air Power see The Evolution of PRC Air Power or his recent Congressional testimony Global Impact Of Evolving PRC Military Capabilities)

Our allies our very aware of the trends we’ve been discussing here.  So much so that those trends are already significantly affecting their strategy and decision-making processes. All you need to do is look at the 2009 Australian Defense White Paper –here they are pretty blunt about it in terms of questioning whether or not they can continue to count on the United States in her role of traditional ally to maintain a deterrent capability. When I say “deterrent,” I mean a viable deterrent force to do the kinds of things that you’re talking about—to deter the Chinese from any notion of adventurism outside their borders…..

We have to build a force to present a complex set of challenges that are so disconcerting to potential adversaries that they wouldn’t even consider taking it on because of fear of failure.

Excerpted from The Chinese Challenge

Templates for Understanding the Chinese Challenge

A global shift in manufacturing capability towards China, a significant investment by China in global commodities and the enhanced presence of China on the world stage are all significant developments. When married to a growing investment in the development and fielding of military capabilities, something globally significant is afoot, of the sort which suggests changing epochs.

This all raises the question of what template or templates to use when dealing with interpreting the ascendant Chinese military challenge?

Many analysts simply compare or contrast the state of Chinese military power to that of the United States. This is seriously flawed because the U.S. built a power projection capability to deal with the Soviet Union and Asian operations, and the sunk cost in this investment still provides for unparalleled global capabilities.

But sunk cost is not the same as making significant investments to build new capabilities. And many analysts confuse past historical capabilities persistent into the present with future realities shaped by absent investments necessary to shape relevant capabilities for the future.

China does not need to mimic or match U.S. power projection capabilities to become ascendant. They need simply to project power into the Asian region to reshift the power relationships within Asia.

The U.S. has been the key lynchpin holding together the Asian powers, which de facto contain China. An ability to threaten the lynchpin function is almost enough by itself to create the effect which the Chinese leadership would wish to create – Asian powers competing with one another without the binding power of the American lynchpin. This leaves them open to Chinese hard power being married to the ascendant soft power of China in the region.

The capabilities which the Chinese are emphasizing – notably air and missile systems – are eminently exportable. By having a first class missile business a decade out, the Chinese can change regional power balances by export policy only incidentally supported by the power projection capability necessary to dominate in far away regions.

Also, the Chinese are enhancing their Coast Guard capabilities to shape their role in securing the conveyer belt of goods and services. They have entered the world in the fight against piracy and are participating with Coast Guard or Navy ships and assets far away from Chinese waters.

Additionally, the tool sets of no interest for Western or U.S. forces to acquire, such as mini submarines, are of interest to the Chinese. They have a distinct interest to invest in “asymmetric” technologies to shape disruptive capabilities to U.S. and allied forces.

For example, the Chinese recently used a mini sub to project power. According to Reuters: China said on Thursday it had used a small, manned submarine to plant the national flag deep beneath the South China Sea, where Beijing has tussled with Washington and Southeast Asian nations over territorial disputes. The submarine achieved the feat during 17 dives from May to July, when it went as deep as 3,759 meters (12,330 ft) below the South China Sea, the official China News Service said, citing the Ministry of Science and Technology and State Oceanic Administration.

The largest Coast Guard fleet in Asia belongs to Japan, but the Chinese are expanding their fleet. Americans often forget the significance of global USCG activities and with the USN entering into some traditional domains operated by the USCG with its littoral assets, the role of Coast Guard activities as part of the global presence activity will grow in significance. This is especially due to the role of global maritime trade, the need to protect the “conveyer belt of goods” and the expanded significance of offshore minerals and commodities. Presence is a key good for power projection in the 21st century, even if this presence is playing “civil” functions.

In other words, the Chinese can invest in technologies for global export, for enhanced “asymmetric” capabilities, and anti-access denial and it is enough to degrade declining numbers of U.S. forces.

Indeed, unless the U.S. shapes innovative joint con-ops and invests in new technologies leveraging some of the core new capabilities, such as the fifth generation fighters, the ability to deter will go up for the Chinese simply by enhancing degradation of U.S. capabilities. Again, the lynchpin function for the United States is central to its Asian role.

For further information, please visit Decrypting The Chinese Challenge

Military Begins To Contemplate The Impact Of America’s Deindustrialization

The U.S. military is starting to consider how China’s economic growth and the corresponding loss of important American high-tech industries might impact future national security. The Project on National Security Reform run by U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, an independent academic group, has put together a “Vision Working Group” that is assessing various future possible military scenarios including how to deal with a more aggressive China if the United States does not have much left of an industrial base.

“Weaknesses in our defense industrial base supply chain, dependency on third-party vendors, continual disregard for the Berry Amendment, and lack of foresight regarding the interplay between the global economy and national security are the root causes” of a potential U.S. “failure,” according to the assessment, which notes that its views do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government, the Army or the Department of Defense.

The U.S. government does not do an adequate job of assessing the national security implications of China’s rise, notes the Strategic Studies Institute in its “Vision Working Group Report and Scenarios.” “Nowhere in the U.S. government will one find personnel dedicated exclusively to developing overarching strategy with a long-term view. It is imperative to remedy this deficiency in order to avoid disastrous consequences, and reduce risks — both potential and real.”

Read further at America’s Deindustrialization and China’s Rise.

This article was originally published in Manufacturing & Technology News on August 30th, 2010.

Featured Image for China

Military Diplomacy with China

Can Hope Triumph Over Experience?

Despite the vigorous efforts of several different U.S. administrations since 1990, little progress has been achieved in the military dialogue between the United States and the PRC during the past two decades. Since the early 1990s, the two defense communities have negotiated a series of bilateral security and confidence-building measures seeking to reduce mutual tensions and advance common interests. These agreements have promoted a better understanding of the other side’s security concerns, but they remain highly constrained and vulnerable to disruption from external shocks.


The two governments still fundamentally disagree regarding how to manage military relations in ways that eschew these acute confrontations. Incidents between PRC and U.S. military units operating in the international waters and airspace near China have repeatedly disrupted their bilateral relations. In addition, the PRC frequently suspends Sino-American defense ties due to disputes over Taiwan and other issues, making clear how little Beijing values the relationship between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Pentagon.

Excerpted from

Top Container Ports

Rank Port Country Volume 2008 (Million-TEUs) Website
1 Singapore Singapore 29.97,
2 Shanghai China 27.98
3 Hong Kong China 24.49
4 Shenzhen China 21.40
5 Busan South Korea 13.45
6 Dubai United Arab Emirates 11.83,
7 Ningbo-Zhoushan China 11.23
8 Guangzhou Harbor China 11.00,
9 Rotterdam Netherlands 10.78
10 Qingdao China 10.32,
11 Hamburg Germany 9.74
12 Kaohsiung Taiwan, China 9.68
13 Antwerp Belgium 8.66
14 Tianjin China 8.50
15 Port Kelang Malaysia 7.97,
16 Los Angeles U.S.A. 7.85
17 Long Beach U.S.A. 6.49
18 Tanjung Pelepas Malaysia 5.60
19 Bremen/Bremerhaven Germany 5.45
20 New York and New Jersey U.S.A. 5.27
21 Laem Chabang Thailand 5.13
22 Xiamen China 5.03
23 Dalian China 4.50
24 Tanjung Priok Indonesia 3.98,
25 Jawaharlal Nehru India 3.95
26 Hanshin Japan 3.90,
27 Tokyo Japan 3.73
28 Colombo Sri Lanka 3.69
29 Valencia Spain 3.60
30 Yokohama Japan 3.48
31 Gioia Tauro Italy 3.47,
32 Ho Chi Minh Vietnam 3.43
33 Felixstowe U.K. 3.35
34 Algeciras Bay Spain 3.33
35 Jeddah Saudi Arabia 3.33
36 Port Said Egypt 3.19,
37 Salalah Oman 3.07
38 Lianyungung China 3.00
39 Manila Philippines 3.00
40 Nagoya Japan 2.82
41 Santos Brazil 2.67
42 Durban South Africa 2.64
43 Georgia Ports U.S.A. 2.62
44 Barcelona Spain 2.57
45 Sharjah United Arab Emirates 2.50,
46 Le Havre France 2.50
47 Port Metro Vancouver, British Columbia Canada 2.49
48 Melbourne Australia 2.30
49 Marsaxlokk Malta 2.30
50 Ambarli Turkey 2.26

Note: As published in The Journal of Commerce, August 3, 2009 edition.

Top Holders of Foreign Currency Reserves

Rank Country Billion USD (end of month)
1 People's Republic of China People’s Republic of China $ 2850 (Dec 2010)[2]
2 Japan $ 1092 (Jan 2011)[3]
European Union Eurozone $ 770 (Jan 2011)[4]
3 Russia $ 500 (Mar 2011)[5]
4 Saudi Arabia $ 450 (Jan 2010)[6]
5 Republic of China (Taiwan) $ 391 (Feb 2011)[7]
6 Brazil $ 316 (Mar 2011)[8]
7 India $ 304 (Mar 2011)[9]
8 South Korea $ 298 (Feb 2011)[10]
9 Hong Kong $ 273 (Jan 2011)[4]
10 Switzerland $ 272 (Jan 2011)[4]
11 Singapore $ 227 (Jan 2011)[4]
12 Germany $ 209 (Jan 2011)[4]
13 Thailand $ 182 (Mar 2011)[11]
14 France $ 161 (Jan 2011)[4]
15 Algeria $ 155 (Dec 2010)[12]
16 Italy $ 154 (Jan 2011)[4]
17 United States $ 133 (Feb 2011)[4]
18 Mexico $ 124 (Jan 2011)[13]
19 United Kingdom $ 115 (Feb 2011)[4]
20 Malaysia $ 110 (Mar 2011)[14]