North Korea is believed to be making preparations for another ICBM test on National Day. A missile is being moved into position at night possibly to hide it from commercial satellites, though it is ineffective against military surveillance.
The launch of an ICBM across Japan on August 28, followed by a nuclear device test on September 3 that yielded about 140kts were in lieu of the proposed missile test aimed at Guam that was cancelled when DPRK discovered that Japan positioned Patriot batteries to intercept Guam bound missiles and other strengthened defensive measures.
These moves speak to a sophisticated NORK scheme to probe the technical, operational and political weaknesses of the US and allies looking for weak points for the future.
President Trump responded to this latest move by ordering missiles heading toward continental US, Guam and Hawaii to be shot down.
Missiles heading toward Japan and ROK are presently not included in the order.
It was longstanding practice that Japan would not intercept or attempt to destroy missiles heading toward Japan (including overflying) unless it posed a threat to populated areas.
DPRK was quite comfortable in knowing that the missiles that land close to Japan but not intercepted can easily carry a nuclear warhead that can blind sensors or severely disrupt Japan with EMP.
Japan, in effect, chose to take the risk of a surprise attack rather than proactively destroying incoming missiles. DPRK took advantage of this pacifist stance to systematically desensitization Japanese targets to the dangers / risk of a surprise attack.
If this pacifist posture were to change, DPRK will likely probe elsewhere.
DPRK showed they prefers targets that are likely to be undefended or can be taken by surprise.
The PRC have begun to show their hand to the US. Global Times made public CCP policy is to defend DPRK if they are attacked, but remain neutral if DPRK attacked first. In effect, PRC-CCP endorsed the DPRK regime’s steady progress to become a major thermonuclear nuclear power.
This can be developed under the protection of the PRC as long as DPRK don’t risk an attack before they can be certain of victory.
If DPRK won a confrontation with the US by striking first, PRC staying “neutral” is a moot point. PRC-CCP would have achieved a victory against the US and allies without fighting. If DPRK lost, PRC can plead “neutral” and then occupy DPRK to prevent their annilation by the US.
The PRC also carried out a very provocative military exercise where PLA shot down unspecified “simulated” incoming missiles on Sept. 5 in the Bohai sea. This is an explicit warning to the US that if a Syria style Tomahawk strike is launched against DPRK from US vessels, the PRC have the ability to intervene on the side of DPRK.
Few western commentators, especially “China experts” took notice of this provocation.
Put this together with the little discussed activities of the maritime militia operated by the PRC and DPRK in the region, and the pro-DPRK elements operating under the ROK and Japanese flag, and intensive surveillance by PLA/N assets reveal a sophisticated defense system organized for the benefit of DPRK. It would be difficult for a US surface unit to achieve surprise in the seas off the west and east coast of North Korea.
Moreover, activities in bases like Guam and in Japan and Koreas are similarly being monitored by irregulars deployed by the PRC and DPRK reminiscent of Takeo Yoshikawa.
These activities make it patently clear that the PRC, or at least large segments of China especially in the Northeastern provinces, is by no means neutral in the DPRK nuclear arsenal buildup and standoff with the US and allies. Beijing-China may talk a good game about being in favor of denuclearization and peace, and decoy gullible foreigners as to how they are concerned regime collapse leading to North Korean refugees on their border – A problem that PRC do not seem to be at all concerned with when the CCP-PRC destabilize Bhutan, India, Nepal, the Philippines or invading Vietnam, all of which have the potential to generate mass refugee flows in PRC by the same logic.
The real concerns of the PRC is the prospect of US troops on the PRC border if DPRK cannot defeat them.
Meanwhile, Beijing-China, if not the Northeast provinces together with the Northern and Central Theater Command of the PLA is actively assisting and facilitating DPRK’s campaign to defeat the US and allies so PRC can dominate the region. Hence, the so called “sanctions” agreed to by Beijing-China is only enforced for a brief period before other sanction busting channels are found by the “local authorities”.
E.g. the ban on seafood imports became ineffective almost immediately as the trade moved from land to fishing boats transferring cargo at sea. Conveniently, the Chinese customs patrols only operate during daylight hours on a regular schedule.
The pursuit of additional sanctions and negotiations exclusively in lieu of other options serves DPRK’s interests in buying them time before their arsenal is ready.
A common hallucination of western politicians like Angela Merkel and Theresa May is Beijing-China under Xi Jin Ping “most powerful leader in decades” can peacefully solve the North Korean problem if only properly incentivized.
The leap of faith required to believe that Beijing-China (even if they agreed) can actually put pressure on DPRK by (e.g. cutting off petroleum supplies) is not warranted by the black and white evidence of collusion between DPRK and their brethrens across the border.
One would have to disregard the willful, deliberate, and overt acts to circumvent and defeat Beijing’s sanctions by the “local” governments of Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Shandong, and other provinces. It is akin to believing that General Chiang Kai-sek is fully in control and command and have the authority to speak for China in 1945.
Politicans that rely on China do not ask the obvious question about how much power President Xi exercise over the PLA and other local governments.
Not only can the cooperation of PRC to denuclearize DPRK not be counted on, the geopolitics of the region strongly suggest that even if Beijing-China can be persuaded to remain neutral, the “local” governments and “local” PLA/N will not be neutral but by default, align with DPRK.
The local political alignment suggest that the PRC will actively work to frustrate the deployment of any allied anti-missile forces aboard ship in the Yellow sea, let alone the use of them to shoot down DPRK missiles on the west coast of DPRK.
Thus, President Trump’s order will likely only apply to DPRK missiles that can be safely engaged at boost phase from the Sea of Japan — and that is only after taking into account the likelihood of DPRK turning the Sea of Japan into a “no go” zone with anti-access/area denial systems.
Boost phase intercepts by sea based systems may be quite difficult under these circumstances.
That means that much of the work in defending the US against NORK ICBMs will fall to the small fleet of Ground Based Missiles based in Alaska. With about 32 installed, and only 40 by January 1, 2018, that is very few interceptors to cover a very large territory and potentially many DPRK missiles.
Furthermore, the geometry of intercept by Greely based interceptors favor the west coast of USA, and coverage is progressively weaker toward the east coast.
A major problem with boost phase intercept by units located off the coast of DPRK is the direction of the missile launch. DPRK can choose to launch the missile over Russia toward targets on the US Atlantic coast. Boost phase intercept of missiles on this path is likely to result in debris falling on Russian Far East territory which has political implications.
If DPRK chose to launch the missile south (e.g. to a point west of Perth, Australia) in the Indian Ocean, that makes for a difficult intercept from a vessel based in Japan and require spreading the BMD fleet thinner.
What President Trump’s order is likely to do is to deter the DPRK from “tests” aimed at the US for now. DPRK backed down before when they suddenly found Guam to be defended. If this pattern is to be repeated, it is likely that DPRK will choose to launch the next ICBM toward the east coast of North America or perhaps just south of Greenland in the Atlantic.
A missile splashing down in (e.g. Hudson or James Bay) without being intercepted would be an ideal, undefended target that sends the message to the US via Canada. That would likely drive a wedge between Canada and the US in the Chinese tradition of “killing the chicken to scare the fox”.
The alternative, of launching a missile aimed at the west coast of Australia, would have the same effect though it is likely to backfire and harden Australian resolve.
Bullies never pick on the strongest opponent in the room, but prefer the weakest to establish their credibility.
The question is, who appear the weakest this weekend?
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