The Osprey and the Flexibility of the ARG-MEU

By Ed Timperlake

Recently, a reader raised a number of questions about the approach laid out by me on Second Line of Defense.

http://www.sldforum.com/2014/08/2014-2003-fighting-information-war-leveraging-new-combat-capabilities/

His comments can be found here:

2014 is NOT 2003: Fighting an Information War and Leveraging New Combat Capabilities

Let me deal with each of them as follows:

“I’m amazed at how easily you glaze over the vulnerability of the MV-22 in the insertion/extraction phase of any operations…”

These pilots may certainly disagree:

http://www.sldinfo.com/the-first-osprey-pilots-receive-the-distinguished-flying-cross/

Intel planning may have been at fault-but the combat survivability of CV-22 was not:

Actual recent combat experience suggests a different answer:

http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/12/two-us-military-planes-take-fire-in-south-sudan-four-injured/

“How you ignore the threat of a helicopter ambush at the LZ:

The MV-22 is not the same con-ops nor flying technology of the failed Army helo Iraq Longbow attack.

“….How you dismiss the threat of manpads/rpgs/anti-air guns etc on these types of operations…”

I have written extensively about manpad threats.

The speed and relatively agility of the Osprey provides a measure of protection which a rotorcraft clearly does not.

But being cognizant of this threat is certainly a crucial part of the ongoing evaluation of the combat situation.

“And finally you ignore the fact that these so called ECO’s are just waiting to be cut off, isolated and destroyed by an enemy with even a small bit of tactical awareness.”

No read all the links being reported at our very junior grade Infantry School after TBS simply proof of concept of distributed C&C.

It is always up to MEU Commander to appropriately size the force.

The focus is upon innovative 2014 thinking with battle tested C&C and horizontal networks.

This concept that you’re pushing is flawed, will push the Marine Corps toward an even more unbalanced position than it currently finds itself and will lead to the loss of many lives.

Unbalanced how? since I am never ever in the business of costing USMC lives I guess we should alert our CMC “Tamer” and all who have gone before to ask for a redo.

But the underlying point is rather straightforward: the Osprey enabled force gives the US options it did not have in 2003. 

This is not as the same as being the only capability which can come off of an ARG-MEU for the great strength of the ARG-MEU is its ability to be tailored to the mission.

But in this case, without the Osprey, the force can not deliver Marines over the entire Iraqi territory at reach and range and to return rapidly to the ships.

This is what is different in 2014, but it is not the only configuration which the ARG-MEU could deliver.

“I also notice that you like to raise the ability of conducting HA/DR missions? Are you kidding me! The dog and pony in the Philippines was disgraceful. We didn’t give the aid needed because the USMC was more interested in testing a concept rather than helping people. We needed bodies on the ground and heavy equipment…the stuff that arrives by amphibious ship and not by MV-22.”

C-17 in support of Operation Damayan.

C-17 in support of Operation Damayan.

Sorry not kidding I think Sniper Brown, CO of George Washington and USAF would profoundly disagree about “dog and pony’” characterization.

http://www.sldinfo.com/we-are-ready-now-sir-the-21st-century-version/

http://www.sldinfo.com/the-36th-contingency-response-group-in-the-philippine-relief-effort/

http://www.sldinfo.com/the-u-s-military-and-operation-damayan-shape-a-relief-infrastructure-and-withdraw/

The MEU as initially constructed is the most powerful, well balanced, forward deployed force in the world.

That is exactly why I highlighted the 22nd MEU in print:

The 22nd MEU is a battalion sized force of Maries with indigenous air assets the MV-22s, MH-53, MH-60 and AV-8 Harrier.

http://www.sldinfo.com/us-navy-and-marine-team-a-global-combat-force-for-good/

The push to making the USMC MV-22 centric is madness. We’re the Marine Corps, not the seagoing 101st Airborne.

How did you get that point?

I actually visited 101st in Mosul Iraq (a great combat Division) but I must have failed along the way-so time to be blunt addressing some talking heads posturing on size of force necessary for schwacking ISIS inIraq.”

Big Army (15,000 troops) will size their force for traditional linear Hub/Spoke Base Camp and FOB con-ops-USMC ARG/MEU can go horizontal with constant insertion  and extraction.

Both have Air on station–Big Army will be predictable even with helos-Enemy can react–USMC can be unpredictable thus forcing OUR ops tempo on them and generating more “troops in the open.”

The more ISIS cannot  understand vectors of attack day night the better–then death from above.

I found it amazing that when I was in Iraq –some in Big Army actually thought it was a land locked country.

Thank you for a chance to clarify and a robust debate -S/F Ed

http://www.sldforum.com/2014/08/2014-2003-fighting-information-war-leveraging-new-combat-capabilities/

 

 

 

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