In a recent presentation by le général Henri Bentégeat, a former Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces, the General provided a comprehensive look at the future of the French nuclear deterrent. Clearly, he is concerned with financial pressures and the level of strategic commitment to the French nuclear deterrent.
Much of his analysis focuses upon why the deterrent remains relevant and the importance of adequate funding for the deterrent.
There are two key dimensions to the rethinking of French nuclear strategy with the end of the Cold War. First is the need to pursue a strategic strike against countries like China and Russia to ensure the protection of French territory and interests. The second is the growing challenge of dealing with smaller nuclear powers, or what we refer to as the challenge of the second nuclear age.
It has been necessary to rethink the French nuclear approach with regard to the second because “our traditional system of anti- cities” threatdid not work vis-à -vis regional powers with weapons of mass destruction.”
He added that:
“We came to the conclusion (at the end of the 1990s) that it meant that our deterrent put us in a position not to threaten a country from total destruction of its cities, but to deprive a dictatorial regime all its centers of power – that they are political, military or economic .
This requires us to have weapons of precision , with reduced side effects.”
Yet the French President chose not make “our nuclear weapons a weapon of employment.”
In spite of this, the direction dealing with regional nuclear powers must clearly be based on “the threat of targeted destruction” which, in turn, requires that “we must develop weapons more limited power but greater precision”.
To use such weapons will require enhanced C2 and intelligence efforts to ensure a credible use of precision weapons in support of second nuclear age missions.
We need to be able to execute “a major intelligence effort to target the various centers of power potentially threatening powers, and ensure that we can pass quickly, which required the development of systems ” retargeting to the sea” and tools for highly secure communication with submarines and planes .”
The General underscored that the pressure which is building to eliminate the air delivered capability of the French Air Force and Navy would be a major mistake, notably in the second nuclear age.
“The air component is the only one that can make targeted strikes on the power centers of threatening regional powers.”
For the full presentation in French see the following (all translations above have been done by Second Line of Defense):
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