As the current warheads and delivery systems of America’s nuclear arsenal age and wear out, the US faces the necessity of replacing all of these elements of its nuclear deterrent.
Anti-nuclear groups in the US falsely claim that this is too expensive and unnecessary, that it would siphon money away from conventional weapon programs, that nuclear weapons are Cold War relics that the US doesn’t need for its security, that the US should cut its nuclear arsenal deeply, and that such modernization will provoke Russia and China to build up and modernize their own arsenals.
The reality is that the modernization of America’s nuclear deterrent is long overdue, affordable, relatively low-cost, and absolutely necessary given the nuclear threats America faces.
In fact, one could argue that the nuclear threats, which the US faces, are far graver than the Soviet threat during the Cold War.
Here’s why it’s absolutely necessary to modernize – and not to reduce – America’s nuclear arsenal. Existing nuclear-armed potential adversaries – Russia, China, and North Korea – are all growing and modernizing their arsenals, and would be doing so regardless of whether the US would be modernizing its capability.
The Russians Modernize
Russia currently has:
- Around 415-430 ICBMs collectively capable of delivering at least 1,684 nuclear warheads to the CONUS;
- 251 strategic bombers, each capable of delivering 6-12 nuclear warheads (typically, 6 cruise missile warheads and one freefall bomb);
- 13 ballistic missile submarines collectively capable of delivering between 1,400 and 2,000 warheads to the US;
- At least 4,000 tactical nuclear weapons and a wide variety of means to deliver them (short-range ballistic missiles, theater aircraft, artillery pieces, surface ships, submarines, submarine-launched cruise missiles, etc.).
Russia is now building up and rapidly modernizing its entire nuclear arsenal, including its strategic nuclear triad. It is developing, or already deploying:
- A new strategic intercontinental bomber, the PAK DA, to replace the Tu-95 strategic bomber;
- A new ballistic missile submarine class (the Borei class) with two new ballistic missile types (the R-29RMU2 Liner and the RSM-56 Bulava);
- Several new ICBM types (the RS-24 Yars, the “Avangard”, the “Rubezh”, a rail-mobile ICBM, and the “Son of Satan” missile to replace the SS-18 heavy ICBM that can carry 10 warheads and 38 penetration aids);
- New warheads; and
- A full panoply of new tactical delivery systems, including new nuclear-capable cruise and short-range ballistic missiles and theater nuclear strike aircraft (e.g. the Su-34 Fullback).
By 2016, Russia will DOUBLE its spending on nuclear weapons from today’s levels and by that year, 80%, and by 2021, all of Russia’s ICBMs will be new, post-Cold-War and modern ICBMs: the Topol-M (deployed in 1997), the Yars (first deployed in 2010), and even newer missiles.
Altogether, by the 2020s, Russia’s nuclear arsenal, especially its nuclear triad, will be even larger and much more lethal and survivable than they are today.
Not only that, but Russia is not shy about articulating a first use doctrine.
In the last 6 years alone, Moscow has threatened to aim or even launch its nuclear weapons at the US or its allies at least 15 times. This year, it has twice conducted large-scale nuclear exercises simulating a Russian nuclear first strike.
Russia has, within the last 18 months, simulated a nuclear bomber strike on the US and Japan (and even on neutral countries like Sweden and Finland) several times, including in May 2012 and July 2012 (the Fourth of July, to be precise).
When asked in June 2012 by the media about what they were doing simulating an attack on Alaska, the Russians said they were “practicing attacking the enemy.”
So the Russians consider America their enemy – and have simulated attacking it several times.
And they have a large nuclear arsenal to do so if they ever want to try. America’s nuclear deterrent is the ONLY capability, which would be taken seriously by the Russians to deter this threat.
The Chinese Build Out Their Capability
China also has a large nuclear arsenal, though not as large as Russia’s.
Nonetheless, it is large and as former Russian Strategic Missile Force Chief of Staff Gen. Viktor Yesin estimates it at 1,600-1,800 warheads, while Georgetown University Professor Philip Karber puts the figure at up to 3,000 warheads.
This analyst, for his part, did his own study on the subject last year and estimated that China has at the very least 1,274 warheads, not including the warheads for the 500 nuclear-armed ground-launched cruise missiles that the DOD warns about.
Specifically, China has:
- ICBMs: 36 DF-5 heavy ICBMs capable of carrying up to 10 warheads each, over 30 DF-31/31A ICBMs (4 warheads each), at least one DF-41 missile (10 warheads each), 20 DF-4 missiles (3 warheads each), for a total of 550 warheads for ICBMs – all deliverable to the US, though DF-4s can only reach Alaska;
- 120 medium range ballistic missiles: 100 DF-21s and 20 DF-3s (1 warhead each), for a total of 120 MRBM-attributed warheads;
- 500 warheads for short-range ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles;
- 440 nuclear bombs for the PLAAF’s delivery-capable aircraft (440 H-6s, JH-7s, and Q-5s);
- An unknown number of warheads for the PLAAF’s cruise missiles carried on H-6K bombers with a range of 3,000 kms (allowing China to strike targets throughout Asia);
- Six ballistic missile submarines: one Xia class boat carrying 12 single-warhead missiles and five Jin class boats each carrying 12 JL-2 missiles with 4 warheads each; note that future JL-2 missile variants will be capable of carrying 12 warheads each, over a distance of 14,000 kms.
In total, China, by this writer’s calculations based on Chinese ballistic missile, aircraft, and SSBN inventories and on DOD’s data on Chinese SRBMs and cruise missiles, has at least 1,862 warheads, including 802 deliverable to the US (though not all of them to the CONUS).
Here’s a map of Chinese ICBM ranges.
PRC Nuclear Ranges
Note that China’s nuclear arsenal, like Russia’s, is not at a standstill and will only get larger, more survivable, and more lethal in the future. China is increasing its inventory of ballistic missile subs, ICBMs, MRBMs, SRBMs, and cruise missiles.
The PRC is also developing:
- A rail-mobile ICBM;
- A stealthy intercontinental bomber that will be capable of striking the CONUS with nuclear weapons;
- New variants of the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile that will be capable of carrying 12 warheads over a distance of 14,000 kms (i.e. striking the CONUS from Chinese ports and territorial waters); and
- A new ballistic missile submarine class, the Tang class.
So in the future, the number of nuclear weapons China has, and can deliver to the CONUS, will only increase greatly, thanks to China’s development of these new ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines, sub-launched missiles, and the intercontinental bomber.
North Korea
The US must also deter North Korea. North Korea already has ICBMs capable of reaching the US (Taepodong-2 AKA TD-2 and KN-08, which USPACOM commander Adm. Samuel Locklear considers a serious threat to the US) and miniaturized warheads.
The latter has enough enriched uranium by now to produce a nuclear weapon within a month and has been working on, and successfully tested, a trigger for nuclear weapons.
The Challenge of Extended Deterrence
Currently, the US must provide a nuclear umbrella not only to itself, but to over 30 allies who depend on it for their security and their very existence.
If it fails to do so – if it continues to cut its nuclear arsenal – some will undotedly develop their own atomic weapons, and thus, the nuclear proliferation problem will become an order of magnitude greater.
This is not a theoretical concern: already 66.5% of South Koreans want their country to “go nuclear”, and Japan has recently opened a facility allowing it to produce enough material for nuclear warheads in a matter of months if need be.
Saudi Arabia has reportedly ordered nuclear weapons from Pakistan (to counter Iran), according to the BBC.
Meeting The Challenge of Modernization: Not a Question of Cost But of Will
Thus, the US nuclear arsenal is by far the most valuable counter-proliferation tool the US has at its disposal. And a large, diverse, survivable nuclear umbrella is absolutely necessary to reassure those allies – and to protect America itself.
The cost of modernization is not the barrier, but rather political will or misplaced optimism about the nuclear free world.
Tom Collina of the Arms Control Association, puts the cost of the entire nuclear arsenal at $31 bn per year*; the Stimson Center puts the figure at $32 bn per annum – for all nuclear warheads and their associated missiles, aircraft, submarines, facilities, personnel, and programs.
$31-32 billion per year is barely 5% (five percent) of the US military budget (roughly $600 bn per year, a fraction of one percent of the federal budget, and just $100 per year for every US citizen and resident.
$100 per capita. That’s all it costs to deter Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, and to protect America as well as over 30 of its allies.
The US can certainly afford to maintain this arsenal, at a cost of just 5% of the military budget. The ICBM leg of the nuclear triad costs a low level $1.1 bn per year to maintain; the bomber leg, just $2.5 bn per year.
And modernization of the nuclear arsenal?
A new ICBM, a new Bomber and a new SSBN are hardly budget busters.
Opponents of nuclear modernization tend to use cost as an argument simply to support their belief in either a nuclear free world or deterrence without modernization.
The reality is that an effective and modernized nuclear arsenal is need now more than ever, as the nuclear club expands and various global competitors use the threat of the ascension to that club as a strategic bargaining chip against the US and its allies.
Zbigniew Mazurak is a defense analyst who has served as the Defense Correspondent for Conservative Daily News since 2012. His articles have appeared on CDN, in the American Thinker, on PeoplePoliticallyRight, and other publications. Mr Mazurak holds BA and MA degrees in History and is the author of In Defense of US Defense Spending (Kindle Publishing, 2011).
Editorial Note: A key question going forward for the United States is the nature of the modernized nuclear force going forward, notably with significant changes on the conventional front underway.
Is it a triad, or a different mixture of systems.
What is clear that countervalue programs by themselves are not enough.
Leave a Reply